U.S. Congress discussed blockchain voting during COVID-19 disruptions

The United States operates with two Federal government chambers, The Senate and the House of representatives. The staff memo addresses both bodies.

The memo states an online roundtable was set to be held on April 30th at 09:00, titled “Continuity of Senate Operations and Remote Voting in Times of Crisis.” The event was hosted by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, currently chaired by Republican Senator Rob Portman of Ohio (R-OH).

The two chambers of commerce generally conduct all business in person. This includes Committee hearings, floor deliberations, and voting. The document states that the “COVID-19 virus has shut down major sectors of our society including many functions of Congress.”

This memorandum provides a details for five key topics

• A brief overview of congressional continuity efforts to date.
• A description of Senate proposals to allow senators to participate and vote remotely.
• A legal analysis of remote congressional proceedings
• A discussion of other jurisdictions that have implemented remote legislative Procedures.
• A discussion of the technological security specifications the Senate should consider if it adopts a remote participation and voting system.

The words “Blockchain”, “Distribute”, and “Ledger” are first mentioned on page 25 of the document, under the section titled “Blockchain Remote Voting Tool.” The congressional memo also refers to a two-hour online roundtable where the topics are discussed.

The memo raises the key concerns of using the technology for intra-government voting, which stems from using the blockchain for secret ballot votes, where a voter’s identity needs to stay anonymous.

Committee members also cited the risk of a 51% attack occurring on a voting blockchain. A 51% attack is a potential attack on a blockchain, where a strategic network member is able to gain the majority of voting power for themselves. Other possible vulnerabilities mentioned are cryptographic flaws and software bugs.

“Due to the small size of the Senate, any remote blockchain voting system would need to be properly set up to eliminate any threat of a 51 percent attack to ensure that no bad actor could gain majority control of a voting chain,” the memo states.

If a single node fails on a blockchain network, because all other nodes store a copy of the record, it is easy to pick up fraudulent or tampered entries. “With its encrypted distributed ledger, blockchain can both transmit a vote securely and also verify the correct vote,” the memo states, citing the use of a “blockchain-like” national voting model used in Estonian elections.

Estonia became the first country to offer a digital option for national elections in 2007, and still employs an opt-in national internet-based voting system. A digital voting option was offered for local elections in the UK during 2002, and a London-based Electronic voting system builder, Smartmatic, is used for technology services by the Estonia government.

Smartmatic’s online voting system is called Internet voting (i-voting). To access it Estonian citizens use their national ID-card or a mobile-ID, and a computer. I-voting is not possible on smart devices.

For i-voting, a voter application must first be downloaded to a computer. The application is then automatically checked for voter eligibility. A list of correct candidates is then displayed to the voter. After a choice has been made, the vote is then encrypted. The voter then confirms their choice with a digital signature. The application is then forwarded to a vote collecting server.

While this process is ongoing, an independent registration service provides every vote with a timestamp. The timestamp allows for verification at a later period to confirm votes sent to the collecting server. The voter can also check if their vote has been forwarded and received correctly by using a separate smartphone application.

The blockchain differs from the centralized Estonian server-based voting system cited in this recent US senate memo. Records on a blockchain are stored on a permanent cryptographic record that is distributed across a network of nodes.

Speaking to The Guardian in 2015 leader of Brighton and Hove City Council, Jason Kitcat, criticizes the voting model used in Estonia based on observations made with co-workers. “When I and colleagues have monitored trials we have always observed serious flaws in the security and reliability of the systems used,” he said. “Yes, we have found problems every single time, and we have documented these at great length in peer-reviewed articles.

The European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) has contributed to the discussion with a report titled “How blockchain technology could change our lives.” The report provides a clear picture of potential applications of blockchain voting systems.

The paper references the applicability of Blockchain-enabled e-voting (BEV) within small organizations. It suggests, “Given that the security of a blockchain ledger relies upon the breadth of its user base, this approach may also be more secure for minor organisational elections with a small number of voters and limited resources to develop a bespoke system.”

It cites the example of the Denmark Liberal alliance political party using BEV for internal elections at the party’s annual meeting in 2014.